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EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE* 
 
 
Abstract  
This article explores the role of institutional settings in determining spatial variation in urban 
sprawl across Europe. We first synthesize the emerging literature that links land use policies 
and local fiscal incentives to urban sprawl. Next, we compile a panel dataset on various 
measures of urban sprawl for European countries using high-resolution satellite images. We 
document substantial variation in urban sprawl across countries. This variation remains 
roughly stable over the period of our analysis (1990-2012). Urban sprawl is particularly 
pronounced in emerging Central and Eastern Europe but is comparatively low in Northern 
European countries. Urban sprawl – especially outside functional urban areas – is strongly 
negatively associated with real house price growth, suggesting a trade-off between urban 
containment and housing affordability. Our main novel empirical findings are that 
decentralization and local political fragmentation are significantly positively associated with 
urban sprawl. Decentralized countries have a 25 to 30 percent higher sprawl index than 
centralized ones. This finding is consistent with the proposition that in decentralized countries 
fiscal incentives at local level may provide strong incentives to permit residential 
development at the outskirts of existing developments.  
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: R3, R4, R5, H2, H3, H4, H7. 
 
Keywords: Decentralization, housing supply, supply constraints,  
land use regulation, urban sprawl, Europe. 
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1. Introduction 
Urban sprawl – the spatial dispersion of settlements – is a major policy concern in many 
European countries. Yet little is known about how urban sprawl varies across countries and 
how it has evolved over time. Even less is known about the determinants of the spatial 
variation in urban sprawl across Europe and, in particular, about the potential role of country-
specific institutional settings in determining sprawl outcomes. The aim of this article is to 
start to fill these gaps in our knowledge and to identify areas for fertile future research. 
Sprawl is an emotionally loaded, vague and contested concept that means different things to 
different people. It typically has a negative connotation among policy makers and the wider 
public. However, from a welfare economics point of view, it is not obvious whether the 
observed level of land use dispersion deviates from the optimum. Sprawl may be the 
consequence of market failure or policy failure, in which case reducing sprawl could be 
welfare improving. However, it may also simply be a reflection of the income elasticity of 
demand for space being satisfied rather than frustrated. In this paper, we refrain from a 
normative analysis of sprawl. Instead, our focus is on quantifying sprawl and identifying its 
determinants. 
Point of departure is the fact that we can only analyze sprawl if we are prepared to define it in 
a way that actually allows us to measure it. In this article, we use land cover data derived from 
high-resolution satellite imagery to compute an index of the spatial dispersion of residential 
settlements. We provide details on how we compute this index in Section 3.2.  
Europe is an excellent laboratory to study the phenomenon of urban sprawl for at least two 
reasons. First, high-resolution satellite imagery is available consistently for all European 
countries and for several time periods spread over more than two decades (1990, 2000, 2006 
and 2012). We compile this data for 36 European countries to derive various measures of 
settlement dispersion and provide some stylized facts on the spatial distribution of sprawl and 
its evolution over time.  
Second, European countries differ enormously not only in their economic conditions but also, 
crucially, in their institutional settings. This provides useful spatial variation that we can 
exploit in our empirical analysis, allowing us to shed some light on the impact of institutional 
settings that may influence land use and tax policies and, ultimately, sprawl outcomes. 
The contribution of this article is fourfold. First, we provide a synthesis of the emerging 
literature that links land use policies and local fiscal incentives to urban sprawl. A main lesson 
of this literature, we would suggest, is that these factors, themselves ultimately determined by 
a country’s institutional settings, may be crucial factors explaining urban sprawl.  
Second, we provide several stylized facts on urban sprawl in Europe. We document 
significant spatial variation in its extent across countries. It is particularly pronounced in 
emerging Central and Eastern Europe. It is comparably low in Northern European countries 
and in the United Kingdom. Despite the remarkable differences in urban sprawl between 
countries, interestingly, within each country it has remained roughly stable over time, hinting 
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at the importance of – effectively time-invariant – differences in country-specific institutional 
settings.  
Third, we provide stylized facts on the potential trade-off between urban containment and 
housing affordability. Our country specific measures of sprawl are strongly negatively 
associated with country-specific real house price growth and the ratio of house prices to 
incomes. Countries that allow residential development outside functional urban areas have 
particularly low house price growth. Countries with strict containment policies – most notably 
the United Kingdom, which introduced very extensive green belts surrounding larger cities 
during the early 1950s – are today confronted with serious housing affordability crises.1  
Fourth, we explore the determinants of urban sprawl across European countries and document 
that conditional on country-specific economic factors (as measured through GDP per capita 
and a dummy for formerly communist Central and Eastern European ‘catch up’ economies), 
institutional settings (degree of decentralization and local political fragmentation) are crucial 
drivers of urban sprawl. While our sample size is rather small, and our findings thus need to 
be interpreted with some caution, simple regression analysis implies that decentralized 
countries have a 25 to 30 percent higher sprawl index than centralized ones. Moreover, 
greater political fragmentation is associated with increased urban sprawl. To our knowledge, 
our study provides the first evidence persuasively linking country-specific institutional 
settings – in particular the degree of decentralization – to urban sprawl. Our findings are 
consistent with the proposition that centralized systems often lack sufficient fiscal incentives 
for local governments to allow residential development thereby making housing supply price 
inelastic and, ultimately, causing housing shortages and price increases. 
Our article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a synthesis of the emerging literature 
on the regulatory and fiscal determinants of urban sprawl with a focus on the potential role of 
decentralization. In Section 3, we describe and document the data and our approach to 
measuring urban sprawl. Section 4 presents stylized facts on its spatial and intertemporal 
variation across European countries, stylized facts on the link between urban sprawl and 
housing affordability, and our main result that various measures capturing the institutional 
setting of a country affect urban sprawl. The final section concludes with an interpretation of 
our main findings and an agenda for future research to establish more firmly the causal links 
between national institutional settings, land use and tax policies, and urban sprawl. 
2. Background and Relevant Literature 
2.1. Land use planning in decentralized settings 
The literature points out two main reasons why urban sprawl is likely to be more pronounced 
in decentralized settings. First, as argued by Glaeser and Kahn (2004), a system of local 
governments in which each government takes autonomous decisions with regard to land 
supply and land use may increase sprawl. Land developers and households can easily avoid 
                                                 
1
 Land use policies other than urban containment may also contribute to housing affordability problems. For 
example, height restrictions, preservation policies or lack of fiscal incentives to permit development capitalize 
demand shocks into higher prices. 
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growth restrictions in a given jurisdiction by simply moving to another one, creating a pattern 
defined as ‘leapfrogging’. Although sound from a theoretical point of view, empirical 
evidence on this mechanism is ambiguous. Glaeser and Kahn (2004) find that suburbanization 
only weakly correlates with the number of jurisdictions in a given area, thus arguing that 
jurisdictional sorting is likely not the main force driving sprawl. 
Second, while local residents might have first-hand knowledge of local market failures – such 
as incorrect pricing of incompatible land uses and the social value of open land preservation – 
and local authorities might implement land use policies to correct them, recent empirical 
research (Cheshire and Sheppard, 2002; Glaeser et al., 2005; Cheshire and Hilber, 2008; 
Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2013; Turner et al., 2014; and Gyourko and Molloy, 2015, for an 
overview) strongly rejects this idea in favor of the hypothesis that self-interest guides land use 
policy. The literature identifies fiscal zoning as one of the main instruments to pursue this 
self-interest. Fiscal zoning describes the process by which local residents (and homeowners in 
particular) get land use policies enacted in an attempt to create exclusive clubs in which only 
individuals with similar incomes and social backgrounds will live. The use of ‘minimum lot 
size controls, discussed below, as an instrument to reduce the proportion of poor in a 
jurisdiction itself is a significant cause of lower density urban development. How does fiscal 
zoning relate to development patterns? Empirical evidence suggests that more extensive 
regulation hinders new development and decreases the responsiveness – or supply price 
elasticity – of local housing markets (see Mayer and Somerville, 2000; Quigley and Raphael, 
2005; Glaeser and Ward, 2009; Dempsey and Plantinga, 2013; Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016).  
As mentioned above, in decentralized settings, developers can easily circumvent the policies 
of a local government by moving into a nearby, less restricted jurisdiction. In more 
centralized settings, in which land use policies are coordinated or even applied homogenously 
throughout the country or a metropolitan area, such behavior is much less likely. In this line, 
Cunningham (2007) finds that by imposing an urban growth boundary around the greater 
Seattle area, development in rural areas declined, whereas in urban areas it increased.  This is 
not surprising, as implementing land use regulation at the regional rather than local level 
leaves households with no other choice but to comply or move away from the region 
altogether. Interestingly, Brueckner and Sridhar (2012) illustrate what happens when land use 
regulation is implemented locally. In particular, they show that by imposing height 
restrictions – by setting maximum Floor to Area Ratios (FARs) – on Indian cities, their spatial 
size has increased to accommodate the increasing population. Additionally, building heights 
in non-restricted areas are higher than they would have been in the absence of any restriction. 
In a similar vein, Geshkov and De Salvo (2012) analyze the impact of different land use 
regulation policies on US urbanized areas and find, among other things, that minimum lot size 
requirements and maximum FARs increase their spatial extent.  
Fiscal zoning relates to the literature sparked by Tiebout’s (1956) seminal contribution on 
"voting with the feet". Over the past century, individuals have become both wealthier and 
more mobile. They have started to bid in land markets located at the outskirts of major 
urbanized areas, arguably choosing to live in places offering the preferred combination of 
land consumption and fiscal packages. In this respect, fiscal zoning is much more likely to 
happen in more decentralized settings, where local governments enjoy some fiscal autonomy 
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and have the power to shape land use regulations. As such, the literature analyzing the role of 
fiscal decentralization for inter-jurisdictional competition (e.g. Besley and Case, 1995) can 
also be applied to decentralization of land use policy and its interaction with the local tax 
system. 
Another strand of the literature argues that stricter land use regulation in the form of 
minimum lot size restrictions and open land preservation may spur sprawl even within the 
local area where they are implemented (see Fischel, 2000). Moss (1977) and Pasha (1996) 
provide two alternative theoretical frameworks that help understand the conditions under 
which this may occur. Irwin and Bockstael (2004) argue that land use regulations produce not 
only a direct effect via increasing development costs of undeveloped land, but also create a 
land use externality on adjacent parcels. In particular, they suggest that land use regulations 
that preserve open space create a positive amenity effect on nearby developable land. Looking 
at development patterns in Calvert County, Maryland, they find that parcels surrounded by 
preserved land have higher development rates, whereas parcels near industrial development 
showed lower development rates. They conclude that land use controls that preserve open 
land may have the effect of i) draining development from central high-density areas, and ii) 
attracting new development towards areas that have protected open space. As a consequence, 
such policies may contribute to leapfrogging and sprawling development. McConnell et al. 
(2006) also consider land use patterns in Calvert County, and find that those surrounding an 
individual parcel affect its development intensity and that zoning regulation in the form of 
minimum lot size restrictions encourage low-density sprawling residential development. 
2.2. The interaction between fiscal and land use instruments 
In more decentralized settings local governments finance public services mainly by levying 
local taxes, allowing them to set fiscal incentives to attract new residents and expand the tax 
base. Because local jurisdictions can autonomously decide which fiscal instruments to use and 
to what extent – and households react to these incentives – land use varies across 
jurisdictions. Such heterogeneity in land use patterns is less likely in more centralized 
settings, since taxes are levied centrally and redistributed to local governments in the form of 
transfers. In this case, unless fiscal redistribution favors specific places that allocate more land 
for development, the fiscal system does not add variation to land use patterns, as there are no 
positive fiscal incentives at the local level.
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A wide range of the empirical literature shows that households and firms react to local fiscal 
incentives. Households choose to locate in jurisdictions that they deem offer the largest net 
fiscal benefit, i.e. the best tax-public services relation. Considering multistate metropolitan 
areas, Coomes and Hoyt (2008) document that location decisions of households are indeed 
influenced by tax rate differentials and differences in public spending. Similarly, Rohlin et al. 
(2014) find that firms sort across state boundaries to avoid adverse tax effects.  
Fiscal instruments may also affect the composition, mostly residential versus commercial, of 
new development. Solid evidence is limited to a handful of studies. Quigley and Raphael 
                                                 
2
 Of course, variation in land use patterns is still possible in more centralized settings, as local jurisdictions differ 
e.g. in their amenities or their proximity to major urban centers. 
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(2005) point out how California’s tax policies create fiscal disincentives to build new, mid-
priced housing in favor of expensive housing and retail buildings. In fact, jurisdictions in 
California can benefit from sales tax revenues, whereas property taxes are limited to 1% of 
the last transaction price. Cheshire and Hilber (2008) investigate the effects of the Uniform 
Business Rate adopted in the United Kingdom in 1990, documenting that fiscal centralization 
implied a significant disincentive for local authorities to allow new commercial development, 
making the supply of office space more inelastic and capitalizing demand for such space into 
higher market prices. Although Cheshire and Hilber did not explore this, a corollary of their 
main finding is that by making development of commercial real estate comparably less 
attractive, local authorities might have been comparably more willing to allocate scarce local 
sites for residential purposes. Burnes et al. (2012) document that those jurisdictions in Florida 
that have higher sales tax rates prefer to attract large shopping malls over manufacturing 
firms. Jacob and McMillen (2015) find that higher sales tax rates give jurisdictions an 
incentive to attract commercial and industrial firms. Finally, focusing on German 
municipalities, Buettner (2016) provides a theoretical approach investigating the trade-off 
between increasing the land available for commercial use – the main source of revenue of 
German municipalities is a business tax – and quality of life in the jurisdiction. He argues that 
making too much land available for commercial development may actually hurt mobile 
households.  
If local governments have fiscal incentives to attract new residents and businesses, they are 
likely to compete with each other to attract them. The strategic behavior of jurisdictions is 
likely multidimensional and not limited to fiscal instruments, as often assumed. Theoretical 
models show that the uncooperative equilibrium may not only be characterized by 
inefficiently low taxes on mobile factors but also by an overprovision of public inputs that 
benefit the mobile factor (Bucovetsky, 2005; Fenge et al., 2009). Hauptmeier et al. (2012) 
suggest that local governments do in fact use both tax rates and public inputs to compete for 
mobile tax bases. Given this evidence, it seems reasonable to assume that land use regulation 
as well may be implemented strategically. Brueckner (1995) and Helsley and Strange (1995) 
are among the first to analyze such interactions. They point out how local land use regulations 
– in the form of growth control policies – may be strongly intertwined: the adoption of a 
growth control policy restricting the supply of new land for development in a given 
jurisdiction creates spillovers that influence land use policies of nearby jurisdictions. 
Brueckner (1998) provides empirical evidence by investigating strategic interactions of 
growth-control restrictions implemented by Californian cities. In line with the results obtained 
for property tax competition, local jurisdictions seem to mimic the growth control policies of 
nearby jurisdictions. Put differently, a given jurisdiction is likely to adopt stringent growth 
control restrictions when nearby jurisdictions implement tight growth controls as well. 
Brueckner’s (1998) theoretical framework suggests that this interdependency arises because 
growth control policies in a given municipality depend on the regional housing market 
supply-responsiveness, which results from growth control policies in other jurisdictions. 
Thus, competitive behavior of local governments in taxes and land use regulation is likely to 
have important consequences for land use patterns. Competition between local governments is 
likely to be most intense in highly decentralized countries, where local governments have 
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considerable control over both land use and tax policies and benefit from attracting specific 
groups of residents and businesses. In all cases, the ways in which local governments compete 
depends on the incentives that they face and the instruments that they control. 
Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) investigate the potential strategic interactions among Belgian 
municipalities in setting property taxes. They find that local jurisdictions do indeed mimic tax 
rates of neighboring municipalities, but this interdependency decreases with geographical 
distance. Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) do a similar analysis for 70 cities of the Boston 
metropolitan area. Consistent with Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998), they also find an upward-
sloping reaction function.  
Because the competition between local governments is likely multidimensional, local 
governments might affect land use patterns by interacting land use and fiscal policies 
(taxation and provision of public goods). From a theoretical perspective, the joint effect on 
land use patterns of strategically using the two instruments simultaneously is not obvious. 
Moss (1977) conceptualizes an interaction between minimum lot size restrictions and 
property taxes. In his model, minimum lot size requirements may increase the conversion rate 
of rural into urban land, thus increasing the size of an urban area. However, this conversion is 
slowed down when property taxes on developed land increase faster than those on agricultural 
property. Voith and Gyourko (2002) adopt a theoretical framework in which a public policy 
that subsidizes homeownership according to income, thereby favoring higher income 
households, may lead to greater income segregation when lot size restrictions are binding. 
Even in a setting where poor and rich households have the same preferences for city versus 
suburban living, there is residential sorting by income. This implies that the observed 
migration of richer households towards suburban areas – and the subsequent low-density 
development – could have occurred, in part, due to a combination of land use policies and 
fiscal incentives. A study by Basten et al. (2017) supports this conclusion as it documents that 
high-income households systematically sort into low-tax jurisdictions that tend to be low 
density places, where the provision of local public goods and services is more expensive. 
2.3 Capitalization mechanisms and land use patterns 
Recent research shows that binding housing supply constraints – such as tight land use 
regulation – and tax differentials may be responsible for misallocating households across 
space. In a widely quoted study, Hsieh and Moretti (2015) argue that housing supply 
constraints are responsible for misallocation of the labor force across the United States: as 
mobile workers were increasingly unable to live in more productive cities due to regulatory 
supply constraints, wage dispersion across 220 US metropolitan areas doubled from 1964 to 
2009, lowering the output and welfare of the whole country. Similarly, Fajgelbaum et al. 
(2015) argue that US state taxes may be responsible for the spatial misallocation of 
individuals and firms, thus reducing workers’ welfare. Capitalization effects may prevent 
mobile workers to move to larger, more productive agglomerations. 
The empirical literature provides strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that local land 
use constraints are capitalized into house prices (for recent rigorous evidence see e.g. Saiz, 
2010, for the US or Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016, for the United Kingdom). Fischel (1990) 
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and Quigley and Rosenthal (2005) provide a literature review linking growth control with 
land and house prices. The main message is that tighter land use constraints tend to benefit 
owners of developed land and hurt owners of undeveloped land (see the early work of Engle 
et al., 1992, or more recently Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2013). Zoning restrictions reduce the 
amount of land available for development and thus increase its price. The price of developed 
land may also be higher because zoning restrictions create a positive amenity effect, thus 
increasing the willingness to pay of would-be residents. Finally, prices may increase if zoning 
restrictions attract wealthy households, thereby expanding the local tax base. In contrast, the 
price of undeveloped land falls, as new development becomes more difficult and expensive, 
thus decreasing demand from land developers.  
Similarly, capitalization of local taxes into house prices largely depends on the willingness to 
pay of households for the public services obtained in return. If the local government 
underprovides a given public service, raising tax rates will increase the willingness to pay to 
live in the jurisdiction. This is because households benefit from higher public spending 
(assuming that local jurisdictions are not leviathans and do not waste money). In this case, 
capitalization of the tax increase into higher house prices can be expected. However, if the 
additional tax is used to fund a public service that is overprovided, households are not willing 
to pay more to live in the jurisdiction the local tax increase should be negatively capitalized 
into house prices.
3
  
3. Data 
3.1. Data description 
To analyze the relationship between governmental decentralization and land use patterns, we 
gather data from several European agencies. Below we provide the main data sources as well 
as a brief description of the data. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1. The reader may 
want to refer to Appendix Table A1 for supplementary information on the data sources and to 
Table W1 in the Web Appendix for the full data set used in our core analysis. We provide 
maps of the spatial variation of key explanatory variables in the Web Appendix as well.  
Land cover – The Corine Land Cover (CLC) inventory provides high-resolution satellite 
imagery data classifying land cover into 44 categories. The inventory includes four waves –
1990, 2000, 2006, and 2012 – for a panel of European countries. There are data on 20 
Western European countries – Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Malta, Norway, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom – and on 16 Central and Eastern 
European countries – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Serbia. In Section 3.2, we illustrate how we use the CLC inventory to measure 
sprawl.  
                                                 
3
 See Hilber (2017) for an in depth discussion of the capitalization of local public goods and taxes into house 
prices, and the economic implications of such capitalization effects.  
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Decentralization – Several decentralization measures have been suggested in the literature. 
Various measures based on a country’s constitution are obtained from Treisman (2008). Our 
first measure is a variable that captures whether a country’s constitution provides autonomy to 
subnational legislatures in certain specified areas or assigns residual powers to subnational 
governments, i.e. allows them to legislate on areas not explicitly assigned to other levels. We 
denote this dummy variable subnational autonomy in the tables. Second, we consider whether 
a country’s constitution can be classified as federal according to Elazar (1995). This dummy 
variable is referred to as federal constitution.
4
 Third, still relying on data derived from 
Treisman (2008), we measure how many levels of government there are in a country. We 
refer to this variable as no. tiers.
5
 Lastly, we use the Regional Autonomy Index (RAI), 
proposed by Hooghe et al. (2016). This variable summarizes different dimensions of 
governmental decentralization into one single index. We refer to it as regional autonomy 
index. Specifically, the country-level RAI aggregates decentralization measures computed for 
sub-national tiers. There are 10 categorical measures entering the RAI index, with low values 
corresponding to heavily centralized institutional settings and high values to heavily 
decentralized ones.
6
 The RAI index is available for 81 countries from 1950 to 2010. 
According to the literature surveyed above, we expect that more decentralized countries are 
generally characterized by more dispersed residential development. 
Institutional fragmentation – The degree of dispersion of residential development should 
also depend on the intensity of competition between subnational units. Conditional on the 
population size, the competition intensity can be expected to depend on the number of 
competitors. Eurostat publishes detailed information on low-tier (municipality-level) 
administrative boundaries for the whole of Europe. We use 2013 municipality boundaries to 
compute the number of municipalities in a country and label this variable in the tables as no. 
municipalities. Holding constant the country’s population, we can interpret this variable as 
capturing the municipality density per country inhabitant. This density, which varies widely 
across countries
7
, proxies the degree of country-specific institutional fragmentation. 
Conditional on the degree of decentralization, we expect more fragmented countries to 
display more scattered land use patterns.  
Functional urban areas – The OECD provides a harmonized definition of European 
functional urban areas based on commuting patterns. We use these functional urban areas to 
compute sprawl at a more disaggregated level. More precisely, for each country we compute 
                                                 
4
 See Web Appendix Figure W1 for a map with the federal status by country.  
5
 Web Appendix Figure W2 illustrates the wide variation in this measure by country.   
6
 These measures include the degree of autonomy of a regional government, the authority of a regional 
government to implement specific policies (such as economic, welfare, education, security, and immigration 
policies), the degree of a sub region’s fiscal autonomy, borrowing autonomy, the extent to which a sub region 
can autonomously legislate and execute laws, the degree to which regional representatives can influence national 
legislation, the extent to which sub-regional governments impact national policies, the extent to which the 
national tax revenue distribution is affected by regional representatives, the degree to which a regional 
government influences subnational and national borrowing constraints, and the extent to which sub-national 
representatives affect constitutional changes. See the Web Appendix Figure W3 for a map illustrating the spatial 
variation in the RAI. 
7
 See the Web Appendix Figures W4 and W5 for an illustration of country-specific discontinuities in 
municipality size and for a map of resulting municipality densities by country. 
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sprawl for country areas outside major functional urban areas, and within functional urban 
areas but outside city centers. This allows us to investigate whether development patterns 
significantly differ across countries depending on urban areas and commuting patterns. 
House prices and other controls – We consider real house price indices published by 
Girouard et al. (2006). These indices are computed by adjusting nominal price indices based 
in 2010 with the private consumption deflator published by national statistical offices. This 
allows us to relate long-term price dynamics to development patterns. Additionally, we 
control for GDP per capita in the year 2000 (adjusted for PPP) to account for the disparity of 
economic activity across countries. Per-capita GDP and population data stem from the World 
Development Indicators. 
3.2. Measuring Urban Sprawl 
Sprawl is an elusive concept and a variety of measures has been used in the literature to try to 
capture it, depending on both theoretical and practical considerations. Wassmer (2000), 
Galster et al. (2001), and Song and Knaap (2004) offer an overview of alternative measures.
8
 
Theoretical work tends to identify sprawl with population density gradients (Glaeser and 
Kahn, 2004; Song and Zenou, 2006) and the urban spatial extent (Brueckner and Sridhar, 
2012). In line with theoretical work, early empirical analyses measured sprawl with 
population density and urban extent (Brueckner and Fansler, 1983). There is, however, a 
recent trend to rely on Geographical Information System (GIS) data to measure sprawl 
patterns more systematically. A major contribution was that of Burchfield et al. (2006), who 
rely on satellite images mapping the US surface in cells of 30x30 meters. Burchfield et al. 
(2006) define a sprawl index for US metropolitan areas by computing for each individual 
developed cell the share of undeveloped land surrounding that cell within a square kilometer, 
and then averaging across all developed cells in the urban area. The index corresponds to the 
share of open land surrounding an average developed cell within a square kilometer, thus 
providing insights on the spatial dispersion of development that may not be captured by a 
simple density measure. 
In the present paper, we follow Burchfield et al.’s (2006) approach and employ 100 x 100 
meter resolution raster data provided by the CLC. We group the 44 land cover categories into 
four main classes: residential developed, non-residential developed, developable, and 
undevelopable. The non-residential developed category includes, in particular, industrial and 
transportation surfaces. The developable class contains plots of land that are not developed 
but are potentially developable. Agricultural, woodland, and pasture areas belong – among 
others – to this class. The undevelopable class comprises parcels that are physically 
undevelopable or extremely costly to develop, such as lakes or glaciers.
9
 
Using these four land cover classes, we compute a sprawl index 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑡 for each European 
country 𝑐 in a given year 𝑡 according to the following formula:  
                                                 
8
 A more complete discussion of alternative measures of sprawl and urban form is provided in Clifton et al. 
(2008). 
9
 See Appendix Table A2 for a precise definition of these classes according to the CLC land cover categories.  
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𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑡 =
1
∑ 1(𝑙𝑡(𝑖)=𝑟𝑒𝑠)𝑖∈𝑐
∑ 1(𝑙𝑡(𝑖) = 𝑟𝑒𝑠)
∑ 1(𝑑𝑖𝑗≤500 ∩ 𝑙𝑡(𝑗)=𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒)𝑗
∑ 1(𝑑𝑖𝑗≤500 ∩ (𝑙𝑡(𝑗)=𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 | 𝑙𝑡(𝑗)=𝑟𝑒𝑠))𝑗
𝑖∈𝑐 ,  (1) 
where 𝑑𝑖𝑗 denotes the “crow flight” distance between pixels 𝑖 and 𝑗, the function 𝑙𝑡(.) maps 
pixels to one of the four class values at time 𝑡, and 1(.) is an indicator function. The intuition 
behind formula (1) is the following: for each individual pixel, we compute the share of 
developable (free) land within a radius of 500 meters. This share is obtained by dividing the 
number of free pixels by the total number of free and residential pixels within the considered 
area. Next, we average the computed shares over all pixels classified as residential in a given 
country.  
Two characteristics of our sprawl measure are worth noting. First, as in Burchfield et al. 
(2006), we average exclusively over residential pixels. This allows us to estimate the 
percentage of developable land surrounding an average residential plot of land. Second, 
developed and undevelopable land do not enter the share of ‘free land’ in Equation (1). We 
would justify this exclusion with the argument that scattered residential development should 
be considered as sprawling only in those areas where development is not (physically) 
constrained. For example, according to our definition a residential pixel of a coastal urban 
area will not be counted as 'sprawling' if it is located close to a body of water. This exclusion 
leads to sprawl values that are more conservative than those suggested in the literature, and in 
particular by Burchfield et al. (2006). Heterogeneous geography should be accounted for as it 
may potentially affect cross-country comparisons of urban sprawl.
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4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Urban Sprawl across Europe and over Time 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the cross-sectional variation in aggregate urban sprawl and sprawl 
outside functional urban areas. The countries with the highest levels of urban sprawl are the 
Czech Republic, Slovenia, Albania, Poland, and Slovakia while the United Kingdom, Iceland, 
the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark display the lowest degree of sprawl. Cross-country 
differences range from a sprawl level of 0.52 in the Czech Republic to less than half of this in 
the United Kingdom. Overall, sprawl turns out to be most pronounced in Eastern and Central 
Europe and least pronounced in Northern Europe. The cross-sectional variation is similar for 
sprawl outside functional urban areas, with one notable exception. Portugal is overall only the 
12
th
 most sprawling country in Europe but it has the second highest sprawl level outside 
functional urban areas. Figure 3 (for Western European countries) and Figure 4 (for Central 
and Eastern European countries) depict the development of sprawl over time for the countries 
in our sample. It is evident that the levels of sprawl are rather stable over time.
11
 
                                                 
10
 An alternative approach would be not to exclude developed and undevelopable land and add (i) the share of 
undevelopable land and (ii) a proxy for topography as control variables in our regressions. This would allow us 
to identify and disentangle the effects of land cover types and topography on our measure of urban sprawl. We 
leave this for future work. 
11
 This and the fact that we do not have detailed information on changes for the key explanatory variables 
prevent us from estimating first difference models. However, we note that a very simple analysis regressing the 
first difference of sprawl on a dummy variable for Central and Eastern Europe, conditional on log income, is 
mildly supportive of the hypothesis that sprawl has increased more in Central and Eastern Europe than in the rest 
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4.2. Urban Sprawl vs. Housing Affordability 
Many Central and Eastern European countries but also countries such as Portugal, Austria or 
Switzerland are characterized by residential development taking place on the outskirts rather 
than in central, high-density areas. Yet, not all European countries are sprawling. Urban 
development in countries such as the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway or Iceland is largely 
‘contained’. The case of the United Kingdom is particularly interesting in that containment is 
the result of a highly restrictive planning system that for six decades has imposed, amongst 
other measures, very extensive ‘green belts’ surrounding larger cities. While green belts – in 
conjunction with a lack of fiscal incentives to permit development, height restrictions, view 
corridors and widespread preservation policies – largely12 successfully contain urban 
development, they create a different kind of problem. By limiting the long-run supply of 
housing, these policies contribute to a severe housing affordability crisis (Hilber and 
Vermeulen 2016). Sweden and Norway similarly observed strong increases in real house 
prices over the last two decades.  
To investigate whether there is a common trade-off between containment and housing 
affordability, we collected data on real house price indices from the OECD and Knoll et al. 
(2017). Figure 5 shows the growth of real house prices – smoothed over a 12-year moving 
average (6 years on either side of the central year) to partial out the impact of cyclicality on 
price dynamics – between 2000 and 201513 against the average sprawl between 1990 and 
2012. It is evident that urban sprawl is significantly negatively correlated with the growth of 
real house prices. The data suggests a correlation coefficient of -0.42. Countries with a high 
average degree of urban sprawl such as Portugal, Spain or Austria experienced comparably 
low increases in real house prices, whereas the ‘contained’ United Kingdom, Sweden and 
Norway observed strong real house price increases during the same period. 
In Figure 6, we excluded functional urban areas from the computation of the sprawl index in 
order to compare only areas with comparatively low density across countries.
14
 The negative 
association between sprawl and the average quarterly change in real house prices is even more 
pronounced, with a correlation coefficient of -0.61. 
While the real house price growth numbers in Figures 5 and 6 account for inflation 
differences across countries, the picture might be blurred by a more pronounced increase in 
real incomes in countries with low sprawl. Thus, to establish more confidence in our 
proposition that there is indeed a trade-off between containment and housing affordability, we 
further consider the change in the ratio between house prices and incomes. As illustrated in 
                                                                                                                                                        
of Europe. We find that the change in sprawl was about 0.01 units higher in Central and Eastern Europe with this 
effect being statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
12
 Green belts are not entirely successful in containing urban sprawl because in the most prosperous cities 
(London, Cambridge, Oxford), one can observe that urban development ‘jumps’ over green belts. In a similar 
vein, Cheshire et al. (2017) document that tight local land use restrictions cause an increase in the commuting 
distance. 
13
 We choose the window of the moving average based on the average duration of country-specific housing 
cycles as found in Bracke (2013). 
14
 For instance, in the Netherlands 18 percent of the total land is assigned to functional urban areas whereas 
functional urban areas make up only 1.2 percent of all land in Latvia. 
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Figure 7 for aggregate urban sprawl and in Figure 8 for sprawl outside urban areas, a negative 
correlation is evident even for the change in the house price-to-income ratio plotted against 
the sprawl measures. These correlations are somewhat lower than the simple real house price 
growth ones and there may still be various confounding factors so we cannot read too much 
into these correlations. Yet, a trade-off between containment and housing affordability is 
consistent with theory as well as with the stylized facts presented in this paper.  
In a next step, we empirically investigate underlying factors that determine urban sprawl and, 
in this context, we highlight the role of decentralization and political fragmentation.  
 
4.3. Determinants of Urban Sprawl in Europe  
Urban sprawl is likely affected by a country’s state of economic and demographic 
development as well as by its institutional setup, which in turn determines both planning 
policies and fiscal incentives to permit development at the local level. In the following, we 
focus on the institutional setup while controlling for the state of economic and demographic 
development. In Table 2, we present the effects of four alternative measures of 
decentralization on urban sprawl. Our regression sample consists of 31 countries because we 
lack information on the decentralization measures for Lichtenstein, Montenegro and Serbia 
and information on the number of municipalities is missing for Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and again Montenegro. In each of the specifications, we control for the state of economic 
development by including the logarithm of per-capita GDP in the year 2000 (adjusted for 
purchasing power parity). We also include a dummy variable for Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries. This variable captures unobserved characteristics associated with 
these countries, possibly the unique institutional setting related to their common history as 
communist countries. The negative correlation between log per capita GDP and the CEE 
dummy variable is very strong at -0.76, indicating that the CEE dummy may at least partially 
capture ‘very low income’ levels as well. 
We run simple OLS regressions and keep the empirical model parsimonious due to the low 
number of observations. Three results stand out. First, CEE countries display a higher degree 
of urban sprawl. This may be due to urbanization being still less pronounced in these 
catching-up countries and thus policies aiming at urban containment receive less attention. 
Controlling for decentralization urban sprawl is between 12 and 18 percentage points higher 
in CEE countries compared to non-CEE countries. Controlling for the CEE status, log GDP 
per capita is positively associated with urban sprawl in four out of five specifications, but the 
effect is never statistically significant at conventional levels.  
Second, decentralization is significantly positively correlated with urban sprawl, independent 
of the measure of decentralization we use. Countries where subnational legislatures have 
‘autonomy in certain areas or residual powers’ have a level of sprawl that is 0.095 to 0.116 
units higher. The average level of sprawl in countries without autonomous subnational 
jurisdictions is 0.39 such that countries characterized by subnational autonomy display a 25 to 
30 percent higher level of sprawl. This is consistent with the literature – discussed in Section 
2 – which suggests that regional competition and a lack of inter-regional coordination in 
decentralized settings spur urban sprawl. These results are robust to using alternative 
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measures of decentralization. Countries classified as federal according to Elazar (1995) 
exhibit a level of urban sprawl that is about 7 percentage points higher. Urban sprawl is also 
strongly positively associated with the number of tiers of government, as a proxy for 
decentralization, as well as with the continuous index of regional autonomy introduced by 
Hooghe et al. (2016).  
Third, we directly exploit variation in the degree of inter-regional competition across 
countries. In column 5 of Table 2, we account for the degree of institutional fragmentation in 
addition to the indicator about whether subnational units have some degree of autonomy. In 
particular, we estimate the effect of the number of municipalities that are potentially 
competing for new residents or a mobile tax base. As the absolute number of municipalities is 
strongly dependent on country size, we further control for country population. We find that 
the degree of sprawl increases significantly with the number of municipalities. This is 
consistent with the literature on jurisdictional competition in federations and adds further 
confidence in the hypothesis that the degree of decentralization is an important determinant of 
urban sprawl. Remarkably, our simple regressions explain up to 51 percent of cross-country 
variation in urban sprawl.   
Table 3 follows the same structure as Table 2 but exploits variation in residential sprawl 
outside functional urban areas. Consistent with the results reported in Table 2, we find that 
decentralization matters. The effects of the individual proxies for decentralization remain 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the ones for aggregate sprawl. The only exception 
relates to the proxy for the degree of competition as measured by the municipality density, 
which ceases to be significant. However, the magnitude of the effect remains similar.
15
  
Another potential explanatory variable of interest is the subnational competence and authority 
in spatial planning. Silva and Acheampong (2015) provide up-to-date information on land-use 
planning systems and policy instruments for all OECD countries, including the 24 European 
OECD countries in our sample (we lose data points for seven European countries that do not 
belong to the OECD). Estimating a regression with only 24 observations and a rather coarse 
measure of ‘planning autonomy’ is problematic. Leaving this caveat aside, we report results 
in Appendix Table A3. The effect of the planning autonomy variable on residential sprawl is 
positive across most specifications (as expected) but never close to statistically significant at 
conventional levels. Importantly, however, including the variable does not greatly affect the 
coefficient estimates of our measures for the degree of decentralization. These remain 
qualitatively and quantitatively remarkably similar compared to those reported in Table 2.  
5. Conclusions and Outlook  
This article explores patterns of urban sprawl and their determinants across Europe and aims 
to provide a road map for fertile future research. We show that urban sprawl is particularly 
prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe but also, to a lesser extent, in the Alpine and some of 
the Southern European countries. Interestingly, although urban sprawl patterns differ vastly 
across countries, at country level, they do not change substantially over a 20-year period, and 
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 Note also that an alternative specification, which includes the municipal density, instead of the number of 
municipalities and the population size separately, shows a significantly positive effect of municipal density.   
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there is no clear European-wide time trend. This is suggestive that institutional settings – that 
vary substantially across countries but little within countries over time – may drive urban 
sprawl.  
Our main empirical results indicate that institutional factors are important in determining 
urban sprawl, most likely via determining the restrictiveness of land use policies and fiscal 
incentives to develop at the local level. Holding economic conditions – as measured by per 
capita GDP – constant, decentralized European countries have a 25 to 30 percent higher level 
of sprawl compared to centralized ones. Moreover, countries with greater political 
fragmentation at local level – and presumably a greater degree of interjurisdictional 
competition and poorer coordination – also are more sprawling, other things held equal. To 
the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to provide direct evidence of a link between 
variables capturing the institutional setting and urban sprawl. 
Of course, our analysis is limited in scope by its very nature. Our cross-sectional regression 
sample is confined to 31 countries. Future work may be able to conduct a more disaggregated 
analysis at the regional, sub-regional or even local level and perhaps exploit variation within 
country over time, controlling for area and time fixed effects. Additionally, our variables 
capturing the ‘institutional setting’ are coarse. Future work ought to try to understand better 
the underlying channels that create such a strong discrepancy in sprawl between decentralized 
and centralized countries. Such research may also explore the interaction effects of planning 
and tax policies and the various underlying instruments. 
Measures of political and fiscal decentralization available to us are too coarse and the 
variation not sufficient to disentangle the two drivers separately. Moreover, few measures are 
available for all – or even most – countries in our sample. Careful future data collection 
efforts could help shed more light on the underlying channels that drive urban sprawl in 
Europe and elsewhere. 
Our findings can only be suggestive of causation. Whilst it seems highly plausible to argue 
that the degree of decentralization and political fragmentation themselves are not driven by 
sprawl (reverse causation), spurious correlation is a potential problem. That is, factors that 
happen to be correlated with measures of decentralization or political fragmentation might be 
driving urban sprawl. We are not aware of omitted variables that (i) are correlated with the 
degree of decentralization or political fragmentation but are not driven by these institutional 
variables, and, (ii) have their own independent effect on urban sprawl. However, we are wary 
of the possibility. 
Lastly, our analysis suggests that containment policies – such as those implemented in the 
United Kingdom – are not a ‘free lunch’. All countries in our sample – that are at the bottom 
end of the sprawl distribution with the notable exceptions of the Netherlands and to a lesser 
extent Denmark – have observed strong growth in real house prices and a deterioration of 
housing affordability as measured by an increase in the house price-to-income ratio between 
2000 and 2015. These findings point to a trade-off between containment and housing 
affordability. However, we stress that we do not believe reducing sprawl necessarily implies 
housing affordability crises. Land use regulations serve an important purpose – to correct 
market failures (such as externalities or the provision of local public goods). In theory, it is 
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possible to devise policies or ‘solutions’ that correct market failures without leading to 
excessive sprawl or driving up housing costs massively (see e.g. Cheshire and Sheppard 2005; 
Cheshire 2009, 2013). However, in practice, political economy forces make achieving 
welfare-maximizing solutions hard (Fischel 2000; Hilber and Robert-Nicoud 2013). Future 
research could focus on these political-economy forces. Better understanding these, might 
allow well-intended policy makers to design institutional settings (at constitutional level) that 
optimize social welfare via minimizing the powers of vested interests.  
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TABLES 
 
 
Table 1  
Summary Statistics 
 
 Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Urban sprawl 0.399 0.081 0.222 0.517 
Urban sprawl outside FUA 0.419 0.120 0.215 0.671 
Urban sprawl inside FUA 0.408 0.090 0.222 0.555 
Central and Eastern Europe 0.417 - 0 1 
Ln(GDP per capita) 9.683 0.704 8.305 10.930 
Subnational autonomy 0.242 - 0 1 
Federal constitution 0.182 - 0 1 
No. tiers 3.328 0.617 2 4.5 
Regional autonomy index  10.116 10.543 0 35.642 
No. municipalities 3.752 6.660 0.011 36.703 
Population 14.217 20.231 0.031 80.600 
Notes: Population is measured in millions, number of municipalities in thousands, per-capita GDP is adjusted by purchasing 
power parity and measured in the year 2000. In total we have 36 country with non-missing information about urban sprawl. 
Information on the decentralization measures is missing for LIE, MNE, and SRB; information about the number of 
municipalities is missing for ALB, BIH, MNE such that we have in total 31 countries entering our benchmark regression 
specification. 
 
 
Table 2 
Determinants of Sprawl 
 
 Dependent Variable: Residential Sprawl 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Subnational autonomy 0.095***    0.116*** 
 (0.025)    (0.025) 
Federal constitution  0.074***    
  (0.026)    
No. tiers   0.049**   
   (0.021)   
Regional autonomy index    0.002*  
    (0.001)  
No. municipalities     0.005*** 
     (0.001) 
Population     -0.0014* 
     (0.001) 
Central and Eastern Europe 0.131** 0.140** 0.179*** 0.143** 0.120** 
 (0.056) (0.058) (0.051) (0.061) (0.058) 
Log GDP per capita (2000) 0.006 0.030 0.065 0.030 -0.007 
 (0.039) (0.046) (0.046) (0.049) (0.042) 
Constant 0.259 0.034 -0.472 0.018 0.394 
 (0.408) (0.475) (0.495) (0.504) (0.437) 
Observations 31 31 31 31 31 
Adjusted R-squared 0.44 0.34 0.36 0.30 0.51 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Population is measured in millions, number of 
municipalities in thousands, per-capita GDP is adjusted by purchasing power parity. 
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Table 3  
Determinants of Sprawl outside Functional Urban Areas 
 
 Dependent Variable: Sprawl outside Functional Urban Areas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Subnational autonomy 0.092***    0.097** 
 (0.029)    (0.036) 
Federal constitution  0.073**    
  (0.031)    
No. tiers   0.067***   
   (0.023)   
Regional autonomy index    0.003*  
    (0.001)  
No. municipalities     0.003 
     (0.002) 
Population     -0.0003 
     (0.001) 
Central and Eastern Europe 0.082 0.092 0.152** 0.101 0.086 
 (0.075) (0.076) (0.059) (0.082) (0.083) 
Log GDP per capita (2000) -0.036 -0.014 0.034 -0.013 -0.037 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.047) (0.056) (0.059) 
Constant 0.710 0.491 -0.205 0.464 0.709 
 (0.543) (0.550) (0.493) (0.592) (0.618) 
Observations 31 31 31 31 31 
Adjusted R-squared 0.29 0.22 0.33 0.22 0.28 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Population is measured in millions, number of 
municipalities in thousands, per-capita GDP is adjusted by purchasing power parity. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1  
Cross-Sectional Variation in Aggregate Urban Sprawl  
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Figure 2 
Urban Sprawl outside Functional Urban Areas 
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Figure 3  
Urban Sprawl 1990-2012: Western European Countries 
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Figure 4  
Urban Sprawl 1990-2012: Central and Eastern European Countries 
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Figure 5 
Change in Real House Prices (in %) vs. Urban Sprawl  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
Change in Real House Prices (in %) vs. Sprawl outside Functional Urban Regions 
 
 
 28 
Figure 7 
Change in House Price to Income-Ratio (in %) vs. Urban Sprawl  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 
Change in House Price to Income-Ratio (in %) vs. Sprawl outside Functional Urban Regions 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Appendix Tables 
 
Table A1 
Data Sources and Complementary Information 
 
Type of data Source 
Land cover Corine Land Cover (CLC) inventory: 
http://land.copernicus.eu/pan-european/corine-land-cover  
  
Decentralization Hooghe et al. (2016) – Regional Autonomy Index (RAI) : 
https://www.arjanschakel.nl/regauth_dat.html 
 Treisman (2008):  
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/Papers/Decentralization.xls 
 
Institutional 
fragmentation 
Eurostat municipality boundaries:  
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gisco/geodata/reference-data/administrative-
units-statistical-units/communes#communes13  
  
Functional 
urban areas 
Eurostat urban audit: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gisco/geodata/reference-data/administrative-
units-statistical-units/urban-audit 
 Additional information: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Archive:European_cities_%E2%80%93_the_EU-
OECD_functional_urban_area_definition 
  
House prices OECD house price indices: 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=HOUSE_PRICES  
  
Others World Bank ‘world development indicators’  
(GDP per capita, population): 
https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
Note: Hyperlinks last accessed on October 16, 2017. 
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Table A2 
Land Cover Classification 
 
CLC code Label Class (own definition) 
111 Continuous urban fabric 
Residential Developed 
112 Discontinuous urban fabric 
121 Industrial or commercial units 
Non-Residential Developed 
122 Road and rail networks and associated land 
123 Port areas 
124 Airports 
131 Mineral extraction sites 
132 Dump sites 
133 Construction sites 
141 Green urban areas 
142 Sport and leisure facilities 
211 Non-irrigated arable land 
Developable 
212 Permanently irrigated land 
213 Rice fields 
221 Vineyards 
222 Fruit trees and berry plantations 
223 Olive groves 
231 Pastures 
241 Annual crops associated with permanent crops 
242 Complex cultivation patterns 
243 Land principally occupied by agriculture 
244 Agro-forestry areas 
311 Broad-leaved forest 
312 Coniferous forest 
313 Mixed forest 
321 Natural grasslands 
322 Moors and heathland 
323 Sclerophyllous vegetation 
324 Transitional woodland-shrub 
331 Beaches, dunes, sands 
Undevelopable 
332 Bare rocks 
333 Sparsely vegetated areas 
334 Burnt areas 
335 Glaciers and perpetual snow 
411 Inland marshes 
412 Peat bogs 
421 Salt marshes 
422 Salines 
423 Intertidal flats 
511 Water courses 
512 Water bodies  
521 Coastal lagoons  
522 Estuaries  
523 Sea and ocean  
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Table A3 
Subnational Planning Autonomy 
 
 Dependent Variable: Residential Sprawl 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Planning autonomy 0.004 -0.004 -0.010 0.014 0.003 0.002 
 (0.037) (0.029) (0.031) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
Subnational autonomy  0.088***    0.112*** 
  (0.027)    (0.030) 
Federal constitution   0.084***    
   (0.029)    
No. tiers    0.080***   
    (0.025)   
Regional autonomy index     0.003**  
     (0.001)  
No. municipalities      0.006*** 
      (0.002) 
Population      -0.002 
      (0.001) 
Central and Eastern Europe 0.063 0.096 0.093 0.210* 0.089 0.077 
 (0.085) (0.095) (0.091) (0.101) (0.105) (0.089) 
Log GDP per capita (2000) -0.029 -0.026 -0.023 0.081 -0.041 -0.052 
 (0.085) (0.090) (0.088) (0.100) (0.097) (0.086) 
Constant 0.647 0.596 0.567 -0.759 0.723 0.854 
 (0.858) (0.922) (0.894) (1.052) (0.991) (0.886) 
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Adjusted R-squared 0.13 0.30 0.26 0.34 0.23 0.41 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Population is measured in millions, number 
of municipalities in thousands, per-capita GDP is adjusted by purchasing power parity. Information on planning autonomy 
stems from Table 2 in Silva and Acheampong (2015). 
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Web Appendix: Additional Table and Figures 
 
Table W1 
Dataset – Part 1 
 
Country Sprawl Sprawl outside  Sprawl inside  Central/Eastern Ln(GDP/pop) Autonomy 
ALB 0.497 0.497 - 0 8.305 0 
AUT 0.459 0.450 0.505 0 10.294 1 
BEL 0.431 0.427 0.445 0 10.250 1 
BGR 0.402 0.400 0.405 1 8.755 0 
BIH 0.489 0.489 0.516 1 8.383 1 
CHE 0.410 0.409 0.523 0 10.449 1 
CZE 0.517 0.511 0.529 1 9.698 0 
DEU 0.388 0.457 0.442 0 10.190 1 
DNK 0.297 0.299 0.278 0 10.294 0 
ESP 0.380 0.381 0.260 0 9.993 1 
EST 0.390 0.399 0.347 1 9.181 0 
FIN 0.348 0.345 0.375 0 10.184 0 
FRA 0.431 0.428 0.452 0 10.165 0 
GBR 0.222 0.223 0.220 0 10.270 0 
GRC 0.412 0.515 0.215 0 9.867 0 
HRV 0.472 0.519 0.510 1 9.311 0 
HUN 0.382 0.387 0.344 1 9.401 0 
IRL 0.341 0.359 0.284 0 10.296 0 
ISL 0.228 0.222 0.631 0 10.296 0 
ITA 0.408 0.465 0.412 0 10.190 1 
LIE 0.468 0.468 - 0 
 
- 
LTU 0.455 0.452 0.500 1 9.071 0 
LUX 0.461 0.394 0.504 0 10.930 1 
LVA 0.364 0.356 0.492 1 9.008 0 
MKD 0.442 0.442 - 1 8.739 0 
MLT 0.305 0.294 0.325 0 9.939 0 
MNE 0.320 0.320 - 1 8.797 - 
NLD 0.248 0.244 0.273 0 10.359 0 
NOR 0.294 0.296 0.277 0 10.513 0 
POL 0.489 0.555 0.544 1 9.269 0 
PRT 0.454 0.532 0.427 0 9.790 0 
ROM 0.471 0.471 0.460 1 8.653 0 
SRB 0.377 0.377 0.671 1 8.662 - 
SVK 0.487 0.495 0.440 1 9.320 0 
SVN 0.513 0.510 0.537 1 9.791 0 
SWE 0.312 0.315 0.259 0 10.288 0 
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Table W1 
Dataset – Part 2 
 
Country  Federal No. tiers RAI index No. municipalities Population 
ALB  0 3 1.158 - 3.044 
AUT  1 4 22.677 2.354 7.901 
BEL  1 4 32.271 0.589 10.179 
BGR  0 4 1.100 4.617 8.344 
BIH  1 4 28.450 - 4.066 
CHE  1 3 24.855 2.453 6.986 
CZE  0 3 5.333 6.253 10.309 
DEU  1 4 35.642 11.426 80.600 
DNK  0 3 11.568 2.178 5.266 
ESP  1 4 30.874 8.200 40.509 
EST  0 3 0.000 0.230 1.446 
FIN  0 3 4.584 0.320 5.081 
FRA  0 4 19.161 36.703 59.842 
GBR  0 4 8.845 9.499 58.442 
GRC  0 5 6.645 0.326 10.482 
HRV  0 3 8.050 0.556 4.564 
HUN  0 3 10.538 3.154 10.348 
IRL  0 3 1.871 3.441 3.784 
ISL  0 2 0.000 0.074 0.270 
ITA  0 4 22.055 8.092 57.155 
LIE  - - - 0.011 0.031 
LTU  0 3 2.526 0.563 3.490 
LUX  0 3 0.000 0.106 0.502 
LVA  0 3 0.286 0.587 2.439 
MKD  0 - 2.000 1.817 2.061 
MLT  0 3 0.000 0.068 0.369 
MNE  - - 0.000 - 0.607 
NLD  0 3 17.048 0.408 15.423 
NOR  0 3 11.581 0.428 4.393 
POL  0 3 5.857 2.479 37.874 
PRT  0 4 3.706 4.260 10.171 
ROM  0 3 8.750 3.186 22.207 
SRB  - - 5.400 0.205 7.517 
SVK  0 4 8.000 2.927 5.389 
SVN  0 2 0.571 6.031 1.983 
SWE  0 3 12.645 0.290 8.743 
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Figure W1 
Federal Constitution 
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Figure W2 
Number of Tiers 
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Figure W3 
RAI Decentralization Index 
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Figure W4 
Map of Discontinuity in Municipality Size  
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Figure W5 
Number of Municipalities per Population (in Million) in 2013  
 
 
 
 
 
 
